Audit-risk object · Information technology

Access Controls

Ten elements built at material weakness grain from the published audit record. Every element below says whether the cited document states it or this site read it out of the narrative — and none of them is an extracted Notice of Findings and Recommendations, because those are not public documents.

Source
DoD OIG annual audit-result reports FY2018-FY2025; GAO
Grain
Fiscal year; reporting entity; material weakness
Vintage
2026-09-12
Rows loaded
557

Path database/seed_nfr.json, built by scripts/build_nfr_seed.py · extracted 2026-09-19 04:55 · refresh annual

Limitations Individual NFRs are not public documents. Nothing here is an extracted notice: the OIG publishes counts and material weakness narratives, so the finest grain available is the material weakness. Every element records whether it is reported in the cited document or read out of it, and the outcome element is computed from the rosters rather than asserted. FY2018 is published at year grain only, because its per-entity table does not foot to its own published total. FY2023 publishes no roster.

On the published roster in 5 of 7 years, first FY2020, last FY2025.

Position

Outcome
Open
Computed from the 7 published rosters, not asserted
Years on the roster
5 of 7
First published FY2020
Titles it has been printed under
1
Unchanged across the record
What the sources on this site could testnot reachable here

Identity and access data are internal. No published execution file names who recorded a transaction.

The ten elements

Read in order, these answer a different question from the report they come from: not what happened, but what a system built to prevent it would have to measure.

1

Financial statement / account

read

Pervasive, with the sharpest effect on disbursement and journal-entry activity.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

2

Assertion

read

Existence and rights/obligations: whether a recorded transaction was authorised by someone entitled to record it.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

3

Audit risk

read

An unauthorised user records or approves a transaction, so an obligation, payment or adjustment exists in the ledger without a valid business event behind it.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

4

Control

read

Provisioning on documented approval, periodic recertification, prompt removal on separation, and privileged access restricted and monitored.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

5

Control failure

read

Users retained access after separation or role change, recertifications were incomplete or undocumented, and privileged accounts exceeded need.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

6

Root cause

read

Identity is not held once. The same person exists as several unreconciled identities across the personnel system, the access management system and each financial system, so "remove on separation" has no single list to act against and recertification is reviewing a population that is already wrong.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

7

Population / exposure

read

Not published at this grain.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

8

Historical audit evidence

read

Auditors reconciled user listings to personnel records and tested provisioning and removal samples; user listings that could not be shown complete were reported as scope limitations.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

9

Remediation

read

Recertification campaigns and access management tooling; reissued every year since FY2020, when it was first separated out of the general systems weakness.

Structured reading of DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

10

Outcome

read

Open. On the roster in 5 of the 7 years a roster is published, first in FY2020, and carried into FY2025.

Computed from the published rosters, FY2018, FY2019, FY2020, FY2021, FY2022, FY2024, FY2025

Where it appeared, and what it was called

One row per published roster. A year absent from this table is a year in which this weakness was not on the roster, or — for FY2023 — a year for which no roster was published at all.

FYPrinted asRank in the reportCitation
FY2020Access Controls3DoD OIG, "Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2020 DoD Financial Statements" (February 2021)
FY2021Access Controls3DoD OIG, "Understanding the Results of the FY 2021 Audit" (June 2022)
FY2022Access Controls3DoD OIG report DODIG-2023-070, "Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2022 DoD Financial Statements"
FY2024Access Controls11DoD OIG report DODIG-2025-112, "Part 2. Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2024 DoD Financial Statements"
FY2025Access Controls4DoD OIG report DODIG-2026-032, independent auditor’s report on the FY2025 financial statements

Rosters published for FY2018, FY2019, FY2020, FY2021, FY2022, FY2024, FY2025.

From this root cause to a system that can be audited

The first three steps come from the record above. The rest is a design, and is marked as one: nothing on this site evidences that any of it was built or that it works.

  1. 1

    Root cause

    from the record
    Identity is not held once. The same person exists as several unreconciled identities across the personnel system, the access management system and each financial system, so "remove on separation" has no single list to act against and recertification is reviewing a population that is already wrong.
  2. 2

    The business relationship that should hold

    from the record
    Every user with access to a financial system should have a current, approved need, and every separation should close every account within the policy window.
  3. 3

    Data the relationship requires

    from the record
    Personnel separation records, per-system user listings, provisioning approvals.Identity and access data are internal. No published execution file names who recorded a transaction.
  4. 4

    Rule

    design
    State the relationship as a testable condition over that data and run it over the whole population, not a sample. Every break is an exception with a transaction behind it. A rule that can only be evaluated on one side of the relationship is not a test of it, which is why step 3 has to come first and has to be honest about what is missing.
  5. 5

    Machine learning

    design
    Patterns the rule does not express: a break that appears only at a particular period end, a counterparty whose exceptions cluster, a value distribution that moves before a reconciliation fails. Trained on the exception history the rule produces, so the model has a labelled population rather than an unsupervised guess at what “unusual” means for this account.
  6. 6

    Language model

    design
    Explain a specific exception against the source records it was raised from, quoting them. Grounded in the retrieved evidence, never in the model’s own account of how the process works — an explanation that cannot name the record it rests on is not audit evidence.
  7. 7

    Automation

    design
    Route the exception to the accountable office, collect the supporting document, open the correction, and record what was done and by whom. The automation is the part that makes the control operate on a schedule rather than at year end under an auditor’s deadline.
  8. 8

    Monitoring

    design
    Measure whether the control performs: exception rate, time to clear, ageing of what is unresolved, and recurrence after closure. Recurrence after closure is the one that matters here, because the oversight weakness on this roster is precisely that a corrective action can be reported complete while the control it was meant to install never operates.
  9. 9

    Audit evidence

    design
    Retain the tested population, the exceptions, the investigation, the remediation and the control-performance history, each immutable and timestamped. The deliverable is not a dashboard. It is a package an auditor can test that demonstrates the control operated across the period.

The order is the argument. Building an anomaly detector for this account without steps 1 to 3 gives a model trained on whichever side of the relationship happens to be in a data lake, and it will find anomalies there — reliably, and without any of them being the failure the auditor reported. Materiality decides whether the work is worth doing, and the public record sizes this one no further than the roster it sits on: the reports name no population or dollar exposure at material weakness grain, so the decision to build has to be made on the balance, not on the finding.